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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT/DEFENDANT VERNON RICHARDS 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE WILLIAMS CONTRACT RECEIVABLE WAS NOT 
AN ASSET OF THE ESTATE OF LLOYD RICHARDS. 
The essential issue presented by this case focuses on 
the identity of the assets belonging to the respective estates 
of Lloyd and Bertha Richards. Each of them died testate, 
leaving a Last Will and Testament providing that their estates 
would be divided equally among their four children. If the 
Williams contract receivable were an asset of the estate of 
Lloyd Richards, then it ought to be divided equally among the 
four children. If the receivable were assigned to Vernon 
Richards prior to Lloyd's death, then it is not an asset of the 
estate and belongs solely to Vernon Richards. The issue is 
thus whether the receivable belonged to the estate of Lloyd 
Richards at his death. 
The evidence below was undisputed that Lloyd Richards 
executed an Assignment of Contract (Exhibits 34 and 36) 
assigning to Vernon Richards all of Lloyd Richards' right, 
title, and interest to the Uniform Real Estate Contract with 
Robert Williams. (Tr. Vol. Ill, at 11-12.) Lloyd Richards 
further had Vernon Richards' name substituted for his own on 
the escrow account at First Security Bank into which Mr. 
Williams made his payments on the contract. The bank, in turn, 
forwarded the payments so received to Vernon Richards. (Tr. 
Vol. Ill, at 14-19.) 
In their brief, plaintiffs claim that "the evidence is 
clear and convincing that Lloyd Richards intended that his 
estate should be divided equally among his children." 
(Respondents' brief, at 25.) Vernon Richards does not dispute 
that fact, for it is provided clearly in Lloyd Richards' Last 
Will and Testament. The Williams contract receivable, however, 
was not an asset of Lloyd Richards estate, having been assigned 
to Vernon Richards prior to Lloyd Richards' death. 
Throughout their brief, plaintiffs observe that the 
lower court found "by clear and convincing evidence" that the 
Williams contract receivable constituted an asset of Lloyd 
Richards estate. Plaintiffs ignore almost entirely, however, 
the fact that the contract was assigned to Vernon Richards 
prior to Lloyd Richards' death,. The only arguments brought by 
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plaintiffs against the validity of the Assignment of Contract 
are: (1) there was no consideration; and (2) the Assignment 
was void because Vernon Richards was in a confidential 
relationship with Lloyd Richards (Respondents' brief, at 
23-25.) These points are addressed below. 
A. The Assignment of Contract is supported by 
consideration or, in the alternative, constitute a 
valid gift from Lloyd Richards to Vernon Richards. 
In their brief, plaintiffs contend that "[t]he 
transfers and transactions between the deceased parents and 
Appellant show no consideration running from Appellant to 
parent." (Respondents' brief at 23.) Plaintiffs are 
presumably here referring to the Assignment of Contract. This 
assertion, however, is contrary to the plain language of 
paragraph 1 of the Assignment of Contract (Exhibit 36) which 
states: 
That the assignors in consideration of the 
Payment of Ten Dollars and other good and 
valuable consideration, the receipt of which is 
hereby acknowledged, assign to the assignees, 
all their right, title and interest in and to 
said above described property as evidenced by the 
aforesaid Uniform Real State Contract of August 
5, 1975 concerning the above described property. 
(Emphasis added.) 
No evidence vis presented at the trial to rebut the 
assertion in the Assignment of Contract that Vernon Richards 
paid ten dollars to L3oyd Richards in consideration. Moreover, 
as argued in Vernon Richard's initial brief, the recitation of 
consideration in the Assignment is sufficient to make it 
enforceable even if the consideration recited was never 
actually received. (Appellant's brief, at 16-17.) Vernon 
Richards additionally argued, in the alternative, that the 
assignment constituted a valid inter vivos gift from Lloyd 
Richards to Vernon Richards. (Appellant's brief, at 17.) 
Accordingly, the lower court's finding that the 
Williams Contract receivable constituted an asset of Lloyd 
Richard's estate was not supported by any evidence, let alone 
clear and convincing evidence, and must be reversed. 
B. The existence of a confidential relationship between 
Vernon Richards and Lloyd Richards was not raised or 
argued in the lower court and cannot be considered as 
an issue on appeal. 
In their brief, for the first time, plaintiffs claim 
that a confidential relationship existed between Vernon 
Richards and Lloyd Richards, which "creates a presumption that 
the transaction is unfair and shifts the burden of proving that 
it was a fair transaction from the Respondents to Appellant." 
(Respondent's brief, at 24.) This issue was never raised or 
argued before the trial court and cannot be considered on 
appeal. In Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 
1984), this Court held that "matters neither raised in the 
pleadings nor put in issue at the trial cannot be considered 
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for the first time on appeal." Id. at 758. Plaintiffs failed 
to raise the issue of the existence of a confidential 
relationship either in their pleadings or at trial and cannot 
belatedly raise those questions for the first time in this 
appeal. 
Even if this issue is considered on its merits, the 
evidence was.ample that the transaction between Lloyd Richards 
and Vernon Richards was untainted by any relationship between 
Vernon Richards and his father and was not the result of undue 
influence. The evidence showed that Lloyd Richards had been 
very upset with how plaintiffs had handled the distribution of 
Bertha's estate. (Tr. Vol. II, at 145-48.) He was upset 
because plaintiffs had borrowed significant sums from their 
parents and Vernon had not borrowed anything, and he felt that 
Vernon was being treated unfairly. 
Following Bertha's death, Lloyd called Vernon Richards 
on the telephone and invited him to come to Vernal. Vernon and 
his daughter-in-law, Betty Richards, drove to Vernal where 
Lloyd stated that he wanted to assign to Vernon the Williams 
contract and also make him a joint tenant on the two checking 
accounts at First Security Bank and Zions First National Bank, 
taking Delores Merkley's name off the accounts. According to 
Vernon Richards, his father "was unhappy with the way that --
some of the things that Delores was doing," (Tr. Vol. II., at 
143), including taking things out of the house after Bertha's 
death. (Tr. Vol. II, at 144-45.) Lloyd Richards also believed 
that plaintiffs had taken papers from his home, including 
promissory notes that they had signed payable to their 
parents. (Tr. Vol. II, at 141.) 
Being disturbed by the conduct of his daughter, Lloyd 
made the arrangements for the Assignment of Contract to be 
prepared by his attorney, John C. Beaslin, and executed it. He 
also caused Vernon's name to be placed on the two checking 
accounts and the escrow account at First Security Bank into 
which the Williams contract receivable was paid. He made 
arrangements for Vernon to visit the banks and sign the 
signature cards. There was no evidence that Vernon Richards 
suggested this procedure or took advantage of his father. 
Lloyd Richards initiated the transactions on his own and saw 
them through to their conclusion. 
Moreover, plaintiff Delores Merkley is hardly in a 
position to claim that Vernon Richards exerted undue influence 
on his father. It can certainly be argued that she was in a 
confidential relationship with her mother, Bertha Richards. As 
plaintiffs admit in their brief, Mrs. Merkley "helped her 
mother in dividing up her estate and making the allocations." 
(Respondents' brief, at 6.) In fact, Delores lived three miles 
from her mother and saw her every night after it was discovered 
that Bertha had a brain tumor, (Tr. Vol. II, at 66.) Bertha 
placed a great deal of confidence in Delores, whom she trusted 
to handle her financial affairs. Delores wrote a check on 
Bertha's account for $50,922.24, to purchase the certificates 
for the children. (Tr. Vol. II, at 66-67; Exhibit 9.) Delores 
also wrote all of the notes dealing with the disposition of 
Bertha's estate, Exhibit 8. It is clear from the evidence that 
Delores was in a confidential relationship with Bertha and did 
in fact exert significant influence over her. 
Because the issue of confidential relationships and 
undue influence was not raised below, it ought not to be 
considered. To the extent that this Court does consider it, it 
ought to consider also the evidence of undue influence on the 
part of Delores Merkley. 
II. 
THE TWO JOINT CHECKING ACCOUNTS PASSED TO 
VERNON RICHARDS, AS THE SURVIVING JOINT 
TENANT, ON THE DEATH OF LLOYD RICHARDS. 
The evidence at the trial was not controverted that 
Vernon Richards was a joint tenant with Lloyd Richards on the 
two checking accounts at First Security Bank and at Zions First 
National Bank. As argued in his initial brief, the-Utah 
Multiple-Party Accounts statute, Utah Code Ann. § 75-6-104(1) 
(1978), provides that, on the death of a joint tenant, all sums 
remaining in a joint account pass by operation of law to the 
surviving joint tenant "unless there is clear and convincing 
evidence of a different intention at the time the account is 
created." The lower court held that the sums contained in the 
two joint accounts constituted assets of Lloyd Richards' 
estate. There was no evidence, let alone clear and convincing 
evidence, of an intention on the part of Lloyd Richards that 
those sums would remain in his estate at the time the joint 
tenancy with Vernon Richards was created. As indicated above, 
the only evidence at trial concerning Lloyd Richards intent 
came from the testimony of Vernon Richards and Betty Richards 
that Lloyd Richards was upset with how his wife's estate had 
been handled and thought that Vernon Richards had been treated 
unfairly. Each of plaintiffs had borrowed money from their 
parents. Vernon and his wife had borrowed very little. (Tr. 
Vol. II, at 147-48.) He also was upset because Delores Merkley 
had taken things from the house following Bertha's death. 
The case of Culley v. Culley, 17 Utah 2d 62, 404 P.2d 
657 (1965), cited by plaintiffs, is distinguishable. In that 
ase, the son of the decedent had signed as a joint tenant on a 
savings account and claimed a right of survivorship in the 
account following his father's death. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the lower court ruling that it had never been intended 
that the son have an interest in the account while he was 
alive, holding that the evidence was clear and convincing. 
Id. at 659. The opinion in Culley was handed down prior to 
the adoption in 19 75 of the Multiple-party Accounts statute, 
Utah Code A m i § ? 5 6 * ' 1 Indei 11 ii s st ' a 1:t 11 e , 11 HE • ques t ion 
is whether the decedent intended something other than that the 
sums in I be joint account should pass t <• *-V- surviving tenant 
i rliH.it li In t IN- pie *. ' .-*• :.* . . *-is no evidence of a 
contrary intention on the ; r: of Lloyd Richards when the joint 
tenancy was established. 
In thei x br i ef, plaintiffs repeat the lower courts 
finding that Lloyd Richards intended the two checking accounts, 
and the other assets in dispute, to constitute asset *;. i,| Ins 
f-state !• L«* livi.it d equally. Plaintiffs refer I. c i the "conduct 
i the parties11 and the "conduct of the decedents,ff 
(Respondent's brief, at 25) as supporting the eour l,fs 
determination that Vernon Richards was made a joint, tenant on 
the accounts merely so that he could act as a fiduciary "in 
handling of the property in !;, I • laitls t\statt for 1 he 
benefit of himself and his brothers and sister." Id. Nowhere 
:i n their brief, however, do plaintiffs describe the conduct to 
which they are referring, T'laint i 1" f s point In nn pvideiu.t' m 
the record of any intention on the part of Lloyd Richards other 
than that wanted :, *; n Vernon the Williams Contract and 
tl: le si- '• ;. • • i\'i.\i accoi mts. Plaintiffs' 
statements are merely conclusory ;i d are unsupported by clear 
and convincing evidence. 
Accordingly, this court should hold that sums 
remaining on deposit in the First Security Bank and Zions First 
National Bank checking accounts passed to Vernon Richards as 
the surviving joint tenant by operation of law at the death of 
Lloyd Richards. 
III. 
BERTHA RICHARDS DID NOT MAKE VALID INTER VIVOS GIFTS 
OF THE CERTIFICATES PRIOR TO HER DEATH. 
As argued in Point IV/C of Vernon Richards' initial 
brief, Bertha Richards' attempt to make an inter vivos gift of 
certificates to her children was invalid because the 
certificates were not delivered prior to her death. Delivery 
is an essential element of an inter vivos gift. Because the 
certificates were never delivered to Bertha Richards' children, 
the sums on deposit constituted assets of Bertha Richards' 
estate, to be divided equally. 
In their brief, plaintiffs ignore this defect in the 
lower court's ruling. Plaintiffs make no effort to respond to 
any of the authorities cited by Vernon Richards in his brief, 
which state clearly that delivery is an essential element in 
making an inter vivos gift. Because this element was missing, 
this Court should hold that ironey represented by the 
certificates were assets of Bertha Richards' estate and should 
be divided evenly between the four children. As argued in 
-10-
Vernon Richards' initial brief, this would require Delores 
Mer t l ev tn fuw t I ^ i u"i ot ',' .' ,000 Ofi in W nri m R i c h a r d s , Gordon 
"Laddy" Richards $ 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 , and S h i r l e y Richards $ 3 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 . 
IV 
LOWER COURT'S HOLDING THAT VERNON RICHARDS 
IS A TRUSTEE OF A TRUST IS IN ERROR. 
its Findings oi Fact and Conclusions of Law, the 
lower court referred to Vernon Richards as a "trustee." In 
their brief, plaintiffs also take the- positic that Veri. 101 
Ri chards i s a trustee of a trust rinding is unsupported 
by the evidence. Each of the wills of Lloyd and Bertha 
Richards appointed Vernon Richards ns executor and f .1 dur 1,»1 y 
over the respective estates No mention is made of the 
establishment of any trust or the appointment of Vernon 
Richards as a tr\ is tee Thei e v * - t • .:' 
Lloyd or Bertha Richards ever established any trust. 
In arguing that jurisdiction over this matter was 
proper ii„, the Third ludi. 1 a I Djstr' * 'Vmirt l:m Sail Lake 
County, plaintiffs cite provisions the Uniform Probate Code 
dealing with trusts, Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-7-201, 75-7-205, 
75-7- 20!* . These sect2 01 is are not applicable, however, because 
Vernon Richards is not a trustee and no trust was ever 
established. 
V. 
THE PARTIES DID NOT ENTER INTO ANY 
AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE SETTLEMENT 
OF THE ESTATE OF BERTHA RICHARDS. 
In their brief, plaintiffs assert that the parties 
entered into an agreement following the death of Bertha 
Richards regarding the distribution of her estate. The lower 
court also found that the heirs of Bertha Richards "accepted 
the distribution" of Bertha's estate. (R. 207.) Plaintiffs 
claim that by accepting and cashing checks from Shirley and 
Gordon "Laddy" Richards, Vernon Richards impliedly agreed that 
that constituted his full share of his mother's estate. This 
argument is flawed on the grounds that the money so paid had 
come from the certificates prepared by Bertha Richards prior to 
her death, which were never delivered to her children and 
constituted an invalid attempt to make an inter vivos gift. 
Thus, all the sums represented by the certificates must be paid 
back into the estate of Bertha Richards to be divided evenly 
according to Bertha's will. 
Moreover, it was undisputed that no agreement or 
resolution was reached at the meeting following Bertha's death 
and that the meeting was brought to an abrupt close-because of 
a failure to reach an agreement. Each of the parties so 
testified. (Tr. Vol. I, at 57; Tr. Vol II, at 25; Tr. Vol. II, 
at 91; Tr. Vol. II, at 148.) Vernon Richards did accept the 
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checks tendered to him by Shirley Richards a week later in Salt 
Lake city, but tlw-. i> U«J - MM evidtiH,tj tit lri.il M M * y 
agreement was reached between the parties at that time. 
Shirley Richards testified that there was no conversation with 
Vernon, R i cl lai ds \ ?1 lei i he 1 € ft: til le tw :> cl leeks \ I r Vu i , 1 i , at 
25 2.6.) Vernon Richards similarly testified. (Jr. Vol, 1 ] , at 
149-50, -.t:. had the matter been discussed, the Utah Uniform 
Prob ' •. .*••••:
 e , - - ture must be in 
writing. Utah Code Ann. § ?5 - 3 - 912 provides: 
Subject to the rights of creditors and taxing 
authorities, competent successors may agree among 
themselves to alter the interests, shares, or 
amounts to which they are entitled under the will 
of the decedent, or under the laws of intestacy, 
in any way that they provide in a written 
contract executed by all who are affected by its 
provisions. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This provision was intended to prevent the kind of 
situation presented in the present case. Otherwise, an heir to 
an estate would be at risk every t:i no.e h e a c c e p t e c l a part:i a 1 
payment from the estate and would be subject to the claim that 
by accepting the payment 1 le was agreeing that he" was not 
entitled to anything further, In Hto present case, tl lere \ ?as 
no written agreement or contract between the parties and this 
Court should hold that the lower court was in error in holding 
that t he j > art i es ag i eed a n i o i i g t hemse ] ves co i I c e r i 11ng 11 I e 
distribution r-f the estate of Bertha Richards. 
VI. 
THE PLEADINGS IN THIS CASE WERE PROPERLY AMENDED 
TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiffs draw attention to Vernon Richard's Answer, 
in which he admitted having possession of certain assets that 
belonged to the Estate of Lloyd Richards, these papers and 
documents, some of which were introduced into evidence 
(Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 8, 10, 24), included certain promissory 
notes payable to Lloyd and Bertha Richards by plaintiffs and 
others, and deeds to real property in Vernal, Utah. (Answer, 
UH 4-9.) In paragraph 8 of his Answer, Vernon Richards 
admitted that he had received certain payments owed to the 
Estate of Lloyd Richards. Vernon Richards denied each and 
every other allegation contained in paragraph 8 of the 
Complaint. 
Nowhere in his Answer does Vernon Richards admit that 
he is holding the money paid by First Security Bank from the 
Williams Escrow as a trustee or fiduciary of the estate of 
Lloyd Richards. At the trial, the court ruled that, to the 
extent that the evidence was inconsistent with the pleadings, 
the pleadings should be amended to conform to the evidence, 
pursuant to Rule 15(b)- Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Tr. 
Vol. Ill, at 51-52.) Counsel for plaintiffs made no objections 
at the trial to the evidence put on by Vernon Richards that the 
money paid from the Williams escrow belonged to himself 
p- -^ -- i,:. mil tin Jif^ sei (it i'he* estai"e, "That issue 
having been tried with the express or implied consent of 
plaintiffs, the court was required under Rule 15(1 ) to amend 
the pleadi ngs to coi if or in to the evidence . General Insurance 
Co. of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Utah 
1976). Plaintiffs were not p r ej u cii c e c| by the amendment and, in 
fact, wt'i" jlluwed by the court to introduce additional 
documentary evidence a week after the trial was closed. (Tr. 
Vol. Ill, en. ^-r. ; 
The issue is whether Lloyd Richards validly assigned 
to Vernon the right to receive the payments due under the 
Williams contract. The rvnleru'e IN undisputed tluit 1 lit 
Assignment of Contract was executed and maintained with the 
escrow documents at First Security Bank. The bank was not 
uncertain ov e r who wa s e i I t i 1 1 e ci t: o t: 1: ie m o i ie ;> p a i d by Wi 11 i ams . 
The bank paid al] of the money directly to Vernon Richards in 
his individual capacity and not as a representative of the 
estate. 
The Assignment of Contract was prepared and witnessed 
by Johi i C. Beaslin, counsel :>• r Bertha and Lloyd Richards inn 
Vernal Presumab .'...; have indicated on t he 
Assignment of Contract that the assignment f the Williams 
receivable was being made to Vernon Richard i fidnciar; or 
representative capacity had that been Lloyd Richard's intent. 
The Assignment of Contract makes no such declaration, but 
merely assigns the contract receivable to Vernon Richards in 
his individual capacity. 
VII. 
THE FINDING OF THE LOWER COURT THAT THERE ARE 
NO CREDITORS TO THE ESTATES OF LLOYD AND 
BERTHA RICHARDS IS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The lower court entered a conclusion of law that 
"there are no creditors of the estates of Bertha Richards or 
Lloyd Richards." (R. 217.) This point was argued by 
plaintiffs in their brief, at 22. 
There was unrebutted evidence, however, that the 
Internal Revenue Service claimed to be owed debts by the 
estates of Lloyd and Bertha Richards. (Tr. Vol. II, at 141-42; 
Vol. Ill, at 26-28.) Vernon Richards would testify at the 
present time that, subsequent to the trial, the IRS has 
continued to make demands upon the estates for payment of taxes 
that are claimed to be due and owing. 
To the extent that the estates of Lloyd and Bertha 
Richards do in fact owe taxes to the IRS or to other taxing 
authorities, Vernon Richards, as the executor of their estates, 
should be entitled to utilize such assets of the estates as 
remain in order to pay the taxes. If such assets are 
insufficient, Vernon Richards should e allowed to seek 
contribution from plaintiffs for their share of the taxes that 
are so owed Accordingly, Vernon Richards urges this Court to 
re verse l ix - . cour t's finding that there are no creditors 
of the estate. Vernon Richards is further entitled to an order 
of this Court entitling him to pa y such ciehl s are 
legitimately owed and to obtain contribution, ,: necessary, 
from plaintiffs. 
'. VIII. ,. 
THE DEBTS OWED TO LLOYD RICHARDS BY HIS 
CHILDREN WERE NOT VALIDLY FORGIVEN. 
In his initial brief, Vernon Richards argued, at point 
V/B that the lower court committed error in holding that Lloyd 
* - •• : . t i n t i f fs . 
In their brief, plaintiffs do not: respond to the argument of 
Vernon Richards and make 110 effort to address the argument and 
ai 111 ior11: i e s c o n 1: a J i Ieci 11 ie rein. Accordingly , thi s Court should 
hold that the lower court committed error in concluding that 
Lloyd Richards validly forgave debts owed to him by plaintiffs. 
CONCLUSION 
In their brief, which consists generally of conclusory 
assertions, plaintiffs appear unable to point to any evidei ice 
i i I t .1 le • t ecord supporting thp-'r contention that Lloyd Richards 
intended Vernon Richards receive the money from the Williams 
Contract and the sums . - " • • ed :i i I 11 Ie j oi i :it accoi :ints a 1: "f :i rst 
Security Bank and Zions First National Bank as a fiduciary for 
his estate. The lower court erred in holding that those funds 
were assets of Lloyd Richards estate. Plaintiffs failed to 
respond to the statutory and case authority cited by Vernon 
Richards in his initial brief. Moreover, plaintiffs do not 
respond to the arguments in Vernon Richards* brief that the 
motor home was validly given to Vernon Richards by his father; 
that debts owed to Lloyd Richards by his children were not 
validly forgiven by him; and that the certificates prepared by 
Bertha Richards prior to her death were not delivered to her 
children and did not constitute valid inter vivos gifts. The 
checking accounts at First Security Bank and Zions First 
National Bank passed by operation of law to Vernon Richards, as 
the surviving joint tenant, pursuant to the Utah Multiple-Party 
Accounts statute. The lower court's finding to the contrary 
was unsupported by any evidence, let alone clear and convincing 
evidence as required by the act. Accordingly, Vernon Richards 
urges this Court to reverse the judgment of the lower court. 
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